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Case No. 57025 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants herein are the adult children of the deceased 
and have brought a wrongful death action against the respondent 
for the death of their mother. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The facts were tried to the Court sitting with a jury, 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, presiding. 
At the conclusion of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict 
in favor of respondent and against appellants, no cause of 
action. Appellants, thereafter, filed a motion for a new trial 
which was denied by the Court. They, thereafter, filed this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Trial Court's Order 
denying appellant's Motion for New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case was to be tried to a jury. At the time the 
prospective jurors were being questioned by the court concerning 
their qualifications to sit in the matter, the Trial Judge, 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, indicated to the jurors that 
the case was one brought under the "Wrongful Death Statute11 
for the death of the mother of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, 
the judge stated to the jurors: 
"Some people look at this statute as blood money, 
others like it." 
The court thereafter inquired of the jurors as to whether or 
not any of them had any preconceived notions about the law 
suit and asked whether or not any of them had any particular 
feelings one way or the other about litigation arising from a 
claimed wrongful death. At this point, one of the women jurors 
indicated to the court that: 
111 have very strong feelings toward anyone who would 
sue to recover money for the death of another.11 
Upon hearing the comment, Judge Wahlquist then very care-
fully and cautiously inquired of the prospective juror whether 
or not she could try the issue fairly and honestly and render 
a just verdict based upon the instructions given her by the 
court and whether or not she could apply the law to the evidence 
as given to her by the court. The Judge carefully inquired as 
to her state of mind and attempted to expose her feelings in 
the matter. Having done so, the juror was then again asked by 
the court whether or not the juror could properly and fairly 
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hear the evidence and try the case without bias or prejudice. 
The juror then responded to the court's inquiry indicating 
that she could disregard any pre-conceived notions that she . 
might have had and that she could fairly and honestly decide 
the case. The Judge then further inquired of this juror as 
well as all other jurors to be selected as to whether or not 
each and every one of them could set aside any personal feel-
ings or inclinations that they might have concerning this 
type of case and hear the evidence and render a decision in 
accordance with the court's instructions in a fair and 
impartial manner. All of the jurors, including the lady in 
question, indicated affirmatively that they could conduct 
themselves accordingly. Thereafter, counsel for plaintiffs 
approached the bench and requested the court to dismiss the 
one women juror that had heretofore made the comment or inquiry 
on the ground that she appeared to be prejudiced to the case 
and to plaintiffs' cause and that the court should dismiss 
her for cause. The trial judge indicated to counsel that 
the jurors had generally been qualified for the cause. After 
answering all the questions previously put to them, the court 
then denied plaintiffs' request that the juror be dismissed 
for cause. A selection of the jury was then made with the 
plaintiffs exercising a peremptory challenge to remove the 
woman juror from the list. 
Plaintiffs now complain that the trial judge should not 
have inquired of the jurors concerning their feelings they 
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might have about the "Wrongful Death Statute11 and that he 
committed reversible error in failing to dismiss the parti-
cular juror in question for cause. 
POINT URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. 
It is the duty of the trial judge when impaneling a civil 
jury to inquire of the jurors, either personally or through 
the assistance of counsel, as to the general qualifications of 
the jurors and of any prejudices or feelings they may have 
concerning the issues to be tried. It is of necessity that 
the trial judge generally inform the jurors as to the type of 
case to be heard so that the court and counsel can elicit from 
the prospective jurors any information they desire reflecting 
upon the qualifications of the jurors to hear the matter. 
Rule 47 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure provides that the 
court or counsel should examine the prospective jurors. This 
is discretionary and within the clear authority of the trial 
judge to inquire of the jurors concerning the state of mind 
of the jurors. The court must determine whether or not any 
of the jurors are partial or would be prejudiced in such a 
manner they could not fairly and honestly try the case. 
Inquiries made by the court are rarely held to be error, the 
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lack of inquiry posing an altogether different problem. The 
Arizona Supreme Court clearly set forth the rule to be followed 
in the case William H. Evans vs. Vera Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 303 
P. 2d 245. In the Evans case, the Supreme Court of Arizona 
stated: 
"We correctly stated that the purpose of voir dire 
examination of jurors is to determine the real state 
of their minds so that a fair and impartial jury can 
be chosen, and to this end the allowance of a question 
rarely constitutes reversible error though refusal to 
permit one to be asked may sometimes be. The line of 
interrogation objected to might well have produced 
answers that would have induced counsel to exercise 
his rights of peremptory challenge." 
It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge in 
asking or permitting the questions to be asked of potential 
jurors to elicit from them their qualifications, prejudices 
or the lack thereof. In exercising such discretion, the trial 
judge should not be reversed unless it is shown that the judge 
abused his discretion in the matter, resulting in prejudicial 
error. There is a presumption that the trial court in exer-
cising matters of discretion has done so properly. Only by 
clear and convincing evidence should such presumption be 
destroyed. Mayne vs. Turner, 468 P. 2d 369, 24 Utah 2d 195. 
The court's authority in such matters is clearly set 
forth in 47 AmJur 2d, Jury, page 789, Sec. 200, wherein the 
author states: 
"It is the duty of the trial judge on the impanel-
ment of a jury to assure himself that each member of 
the jury is unbiased and that no one of them is dis-
qualified. Whether the trial judge conducts the 
voir dire examination of the prospective jurors, or 
whether the examination is conducted by counsel for 
one party or the other, the trial judge may and should 
exercise wide and liberal discretion with reference 
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to the scope of inquiry of and concerning the prospec-
tive juror, and in the exercise of his discretion, 
the trial judge may properly limit the extent of the 
examination upon any of the particulars of qualifica-
tions of the juror. On the other hand, a trial court1s 
broad discretion as to the questions to be asked in 
voir dire is nonetheless subject to the essential 
demands of fairness.11 
"The form of questions to be asked of prospective 
jurors on voir dire examination is within the sound 
discretion of court. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial judge commited 
no error as alleged by appellants herein and that he exercised 
a proper motive in making his inquiries. 
Nevertheless, appellants complain of the inquiries made 
by the trial judge concerning the feelings of the jurors prior 
to their selection. If such inquiry had not been made by the 
court, appellants1 counsel would have been left with little or 
no knowledge of the thoughts of the jurors concerning the type 
of case in question. The facts clearly indicate that the court1s 
inquiry was most beneficial to the appellants rather than of 
any harm to them. 
The court very carefully questioned the juror about her 
ability to fairly and honestly try the case and did so with 
each and every other juror to be selected. Each responded 
that he could hear the case honestly and without bias to any of 
the parties. Having received such a response from the jurors, 
the court properly ruled that there was no grounds for challenging 
any of the jurors for cause. The court's exercise of its dis-
cretionary authority in the matter is clearly set forth in the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Appellants refer to certain text authorities concerning 
conduct of judges not permitting fair trials as grounds for 
reversal. Such a general statement of the law is undoubtedly 
accurate. However, it is incumbent upon the appellants to show 
that the judge1s remarks or conduct were in fact prejudicial 
and deprived the appellants of a fair trial. It is respect-
fully submitted that the trial judge herein inquired of the 
jurors of their feelings and elicited certain information from 
the jurors which he thought would be helpful to counsel in making 
their selection of the jury. The court neither expressed an 
opinion in favor of or adverse to the position of any of the 
parties. Counsel also points out and cites a case wherein 
it was stated "numerous comments or remarks11 were made by a 
trial judge which created misconduct in his part. 
There is nothing in the record or in appellants1 brief to 
indicate that the trial judge in the instant case made more than 
one inquiry on the issue in question. The court simply performed 
its duty of inquiry so that an intelligent selection of jurors 
could be made. The court's denial of appellants1 motion for a 
new trial was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary and should be 
affirmed. Highland vs. St. Marks Hospital, 427 P. 2d 736, 19 
Utah 2d 134. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 47). 
Rule 47f of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically 
provides the basis for which a challenge for cause may be exer-
cised and leaves to the sound discretion of the trial judge 
whether or not a prospective juror should be dismissed for cause. 
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In absence of an abusive discretion, the trial judge1s 
ruling should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that no error has been shown 
by appellants herein. In their brief, appellants1 counsel 
infers that the trial judge expressed certain facial and voice 
indications of displeasure with the statute. Such an inference 
is totally without merit and not worthy of further comment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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